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Footnotes 
1. Mark Hansen, Litigant Language Barrier: In New York, Court
Interpreters Can Be Quickly Recruited, Poorly Trained, A.B.A. J.,
May 1994 at 38.
2. The New York City Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Needs
of the Poor spent 15 months studying this subject in its local
courts prior to May 1994.  Id.
3. Id.
4. See FED. R. EVID. 604. 
5. Pub. L. No. 95-539, 92 Stat. 2040, codified in pertinent part as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1827-28.
The judge sat on the bench.  He proceeded to read the sen-tence into the microphone in front of him in a barelyaudible, monotone voice.  I interrupted, “Excuse me, Your
Honor, the interpreter cannot hear you.  Can you please check
the microphone?”  He replied, “You don’t have to hear, just
interpret!”
In shock and disbelief, I interpreted whatever I was able to
hear.  I occasionally turned to look at the defendant’s attorney,
but he just sat there silent and motionless.  As soon as the
criminal sentence was read into the record, I gathered the case
information I had not heard.  I then shouted out pertinent
dates and numbers to the Spanish-speaking man in custody as
he was led away by the bailiffs.  
Court interpreters in the United States are privy to scenes
such as this one on a monthly, weekly, or even daily basis,
depending on the court where one works.1 Similar occur-
rences were documented in a court interpretation services
study conducted by a New York committee composed of attor-
neys and judges.2 The New York study concluded, “A system
of justice that allows a litigant to move through the courts
without a complete understanding of the proceedings because
of a language barrier, is an affront to the concepts of due
process and equal protection.”3
At national court interpreter conventions, the author has
discussed with others perceptions about court interpreters
that impact equal access to the courts.  A pertinent, but mis-
taken, assumption is that a court interpreter’s mere presence
at a proceeding automatically fulfills the requirements of the
law.  Therefore, the interpreter is expected to play a purely
passive, unobtrusive role.  Voicing a concern to the court, as
the author did by asking the judge to raise his voice, may be
erroneously perceived by the court staff as inappropriate or
even unnecessary.  
A judge or an attorney may not know that an interpreter
takes an oath to interpret faithfully.4 If she feels that she can-
not render a true interpretation, due to a hearing or vocabulary
problem, she is obligated to notify the judge.  This obligation
stems from the fact that the defendant’s due process rights are
at stake.  If the interpreter does not understand or hear a word,
there results one fewer word that a Spanish-speaking defen-
dant is unable to hear, as compared to an English-speaking
defendant who hears for himself.  The interpreter, by virtue of
her skill, can put the Spanish speaker in the shoes of the
English-speaking defendant.  But when the interpreter’s
request to facilitate her interpretation to a defendant falls on a
judge’s deaf ears, it cannot be said that, relative to an English-
speaking defendant, equal access to the courts has been
afforded to the purely Spanish-speaking defendant.  
California’s justice system must work arduously to guaran-
tee due process rights to its large Spanish-speaking population.
One way to accomplish this is by educating bench officers and
court staff  about the court interpreter’s role.  Thanks to recent
efforts by the Advisory Panel to the California Judicial Council
to pass court rules addressing interpreter-related issues, there
is hope on the horizon. 
This article analyzes the legal field’s apparent lack of interest
in interpreter-related problems as a major barrier to ensuring
equal access to the courts for Spanish speakers.  It also seeks to
dispel certain myths or misinformation about the function of
interpreters by delving into a particular infamous case that
involved the misuse of interpreters: the O.J. Simpson case.   
I.  PRIMARY STUMBLING BLOCK: A LACK OF
CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC EXPERTISE AMONG
JUDICIAL OFFICERS
A. IGNORANCE ABOUT THE ROLE OF COURT
INTERPRETERS DEFEATS THE PURPOSE OF THE
COURT INTERPRETERS ACT OF 1978
1. Court Interpreters Act of 1978
The Court Interpreters Act of 19785 (hereinafter “the Act”)
establishes that a non-English speaker has the right to a court
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6. ROSEANN DUENAS GONZALEZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT
INTERPRETATION: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 37 (1991) [here-
inafter “FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION”].
7. Leslie V. Dery, Disinterring the “Good” and “Bad Immigrant”:  A
Deconstruction of the State Court Interpreter Laws for Non-English-
speaking Criminal Defendants, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 840 n.23
(1997).
8. Mollie M. Pawlosky, Case Note, When Justice Is Lost in the
“Translation”: Gonzalez v. United States, An “Interpretation” of the
Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 445 (1996).
9. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; . . . .” U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
10. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 158-59.
11. Duenas explains that Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are also
protected by the use of interpreters.  In the case of searches and
seizures  (Fourth Amendment), court interpreters may play a role
in transcribing and translating  non-English documents that
result in warrants.  During arraignment, court interpreters aid the
court in determining entitlement to the services of a public
defender (Fifth Amendment).  Id.
12. Dery, supra note 7, at 843.
13. Id. at 846.
14. Critics from the different disciplines of linguistics, philosophy,
and the law disfavor judicial discretion when there is a lack of lin-
guistic ability to recognize a particular defendant’s need for an
interpreter, and the competency of such an interpreter in the
English-language hegemony that is our justice system.  Id.
15. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 448, 490.  As of 1996, only the Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had decided interpreter denial cases.  Id.
16. United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994).
17. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 453.
18. Id.
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 455.
21. In U.S. cities with large Hispanic populations, a Spanish speaker
can survive without the use of English in his everyday life.  The
author’s mother, a homemaker who rarely left the house, waited
20 years before she felt the need to learn conversational English.
22. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 461.
interpreter in the federal courts, but does not itself address the
state courts.6 Approximately twenty-two states recognize a
criminal defendant’s right to a court interpreter, via statutes or
state constitutions.7 The Act’s purpose is twofold: to ensure
that the criminal defendant can communicate with his attorney
and understand the proceedings, and to ensure that a testifying
witness understands and answers the questions propounded by
counsel or the judge.8 The dual purpose behind the Act is, in
fact, intertwined with the Sixth Amendment9 guarantees of the
right to counsel and right to confront witnesses.10 By reaching
non-English speakers via the use of interpreters in the court
system, the Act guarantees important constitutional rights that
transcend the Sixth Amendment alone.11
The Act does not automatically bestow an interpreter upon
a defendant who requests language assistance.  It is sometimes
incumbent upon a judge, who may know little about assessing
English proficiency, to use his discretion in appointing an
interpreter.12 The exercise of judicial discretion may not guar-
antee the non-English speaker access to an interpreter if a lack
of linguistic assessment skills ultimately leads to an unin-
formed decision on the matter.13 For this reason, and because
decisions to deny an interpreter rarely get appealed,  a judge’s
discretion in appointing an interpreter has been the subject of
severe criticism.14
2. Cultural Sensitivity
Is the denial of equal access to the courts to Spanish-speak-
ing defendants more likely to occur if the judicial officer
involved in his case has had little exposure to different cul-
tures?  Most certainly.  A judicial officer who fails to take an
interest in the importance that languages and trained inter-
preters have in a courtroom may unknowingly violate a defen-
dant’s constitutional rights—a situation I will document below.
The creation of a standard by which judges could assess inter-
preter need would help to prevent such unknowing violations.  
Although only a handful of reported federal court cases
have been appealed to the cir-
cuit level due to the denial of
an interpreter,15 they exem-
plify a lack of cultural-linguis-
tic awareness.  In a 1994
California case,16 the judge
withdrew an interpreter from
the trial because the defendant
testified to the jury, through
his interpreter, that he had
lived in the U.S. longer than he
had lived in Cuba.17 The judge
suggested, “Lets try it in
English.”18 When the defense
attorney objected because his
client could not express him-
self in English properly, the
judge retorted, “Try it.”19 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights had been vio-
lated.20 The judge’s error had been the use of the defendant’s
length of U.S. residency as the singular factor in assessing
English proficiency.21
Another mistake a judge may make during his evaluation of
English proficiency is to simply ask the Spanish-speaker bio-
graphic information in English, without inquiring if the defen-
dant understands English.22 A culturally aware person might
readily understand that an immigrant will first learn to com-
municate his biographical information in the second language,
perhaps by memorizing it.  This does not mean that he speaks
the foreign language in question.  A sound judicial evaluation
would have to include open-ended questions such that a non-
English speaker could not anticipate an answer.  
The epitome of cultural-linguistic unawareness is to hold a
bilingual person to the standard of a certified court interpreter,
as some judges do when they encourage a bilingual family
member to interpret criminal proceedings to the defendant,
[A]n immigrant
will first learn to
communicate his
biographical
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perhaps by 
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about as true as saying that if you have two hands you can auto-
matically be a concert pianist.”).  
24. United States v. Sanchez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16725 (E.D. Pa.
Nov.16, 1994).
25. Id. at *6. 
26. Hansen, supra note 1, at 38.
27. Montoya v. Texas, 811 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. California has enacted a Judicial Administration Standard Rule of
Court, Rule 18, which provides guidelines for judges to follow
when determining the need for a court interpreter. CAL. R. CT.,
APP., DIV. I § 18 (Deering 2001).  See FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT
INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 595.
31. Dery, supra note 7, at 843.
32. Pawlosky, supra note 8, at 466.
33. David L. Lewis, Book Review, 9 CRIM. JUST. 48 (1994) (reviewing
SUSAN BERT-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM: COURT
INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1990)). 
34. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 16
(quote by Jon A. Leeth); see note 22 supra.
35. Roxana Cardenas, Lost in the Translation: Courtroom Interpreters
All Too Easily Are Made Scapegoats, L.A. DAILY J., March 24, 1995.
36. Because the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is directly
responsible for the implementation of the Act, the AOC director
delegates the task of constructing the federal court interpreter
examination.  SUSAN BERT-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM:
COURT INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 36  (1990).  
37. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 62.
38. Id.
39. Examples of such training programs are the UCLA Extension
Program in Court Interpretation or the California State University,
Los Angeles, Certification Program, which offers an array of
classes on different modes of interpretation.  Other interpreters
attended European schools where they were trained to interpret
for international organizations, such as the United Nations.  See
Cardenas, supra note 35.
rather than request the services
of a trained interpreter.  To
assume that the ability to speak
two languages means you can
interpret judicial proceedings is,
as Jon Leeth has noted, analo-
gous to assuming that all people
with two hands can automati-
cally become concert pianists.23
In fact, though, the courts
have a history of relying on non-
appointed Spanish speakers to
act as interpreters for the defen-
dants—case in point, United
States v. Sanchez.24 In Sanchez,
the judge allowed the defendant’s common-law wife to act as
interpreter, finding that the arrangement was acceptable
because it did not “inhibit comprehension”25— vague phrase-
ology, indeed.  In New York, a court clerk kept a trial going by
enlisting the help of a neighborhood Korean grocer.26 Just as
egregious, in Montoya v. Texas,27 the court held that since the
defendant in this murder case never objected at trial, he had no
right to appeal the fact that the court bailiff filled in as the
interpreter when a certified interpreter was unavailable.  The
trial court based its belief that the bailiff was an adequate inter-
preter on the bailiff’s self-proclaimed competence.28 Montoya
concluded that even if appointing the bailiff as interpreter had
been an error, it was harmless error.29
These decisions point to a lack of understanding of the
court interpreter’s role, a basic lack of linguistic-cultural
awareness. This lack of awareness, coupled with a lack of pro-
cedures30 by which to evaluate interpreter need or interpreter
competency, makes the Act easier to violate.
Why not simply make the right to an interpreter automatic
upon request, as a number of critics suggest?31 This would cer-
tainly ease the burden of those judges who feel unqualified to
make linguistic-related decisions.  Is it because judges feel oblig-
ated to make such decisions?  The answer may be that absent
ethnocentrism in our justice system, we would already have
appropriate interpreter regulations in place, or no need for them.  
B.  DEBUNKING INTERPRETER MYTHS:  
ONE STEP CLOSER TO EQUAL ACCESS
By enacting the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, Congress
acknowledged the specialized nature of court interpretation as a
skill that falls outside the classification of merely being bilin-
gual.32 At the same time, court interpreters are occasionally seen
as “yet another piece of furniture in the well of the court.”33 It is
the latter perception of interpreters that is dangerous to the
Spanish speaker.  To correct these and other mistaken assump-
tions about languages by judges or attorneys, common myths
about interpreters must be dispelled; namely, that interpreters
are merely bilingual, that an interpreter is the same thing as a
translator, and that a perfect translation is a literal translation.  
1.  Myth #1:  Interpreters are Merely Bilingual
As Jon Leeth noted, merely being bilingual does not qualify
one to interpret, just like having two hands does not qualify
one to be a concert pianist.34 Interpreters earn their certifica-
tion by passing a series of rigorous written and oral exams
administered by the State of California35 or by the
Administrative Office of the Courts.36 From 1978 to 1991, the
Federal Court Interpreter Exam for Spanish (written compo-
nent of the test) was taken by 9,750 presumably bilingual can-
didates.37 Only 2,015 passed this written component, and of
these 2,015 who went on to take the oral portion, only 388
passed and became federal court interpreters.38 If it were only
a matter of being bilingual, there would have been 9,750 new
federal court interpreters, not a mere 388 new certified federal
court interpreters in the United States for that time period.
To pass rigorous interpreting exams, most interpreters
attend one-to-two-year certificate or master’s degree programs
in translation and interpretation in the United States or around
the world.39 A number of these interpreters are already lin-
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guists, former Spanish literature professors, or former attor-
neys from other countries.  In these programs, they learn to
transfer all of the meaning heard from the source language into
a target language, not editing, summarizing, adding meaning,
or omitting, all in a matter of split seconds.40 A bilingual per-
son is not born with these capabilities.  It takes an inordinate
amount of skill and practice.
2.  Myth #2:  An Interpreter Is a Translator
An interpreter is not automatically a translator.
Translations are written, as opposed to interpretations, which
are oral.41 Therefore, the individuals we see in court should be
addressed as interpreters, never as translators.42 The court
interpreter may also be a court translator, but the performance
of this job as a translator will take place in an office setting,
perhaps at home, in front of the computer.  The translator pro-
duces written documents in English or foreign languages, such
as a translation into English that was originally a taped con-
versation that took place in Spanish.  
3.  Myth #3:  A Perfect Translation Is a 
Literal Translation
There is no such thing as a perfect translation because inter-
pretation is a mixture of art and science.43 Interpretations are
performed by humans and humans are not machines.  Humans
get fatigued and respond to distracting stimuli.  Because there
are no definite rules or vocabulary, two interpreters may give
different renditions of the same passage and both may be cor-
rect.  In an afternoon of testimony, an interpreter might process
an average of 10,000 words.44 If one of these words should
escape her, it would still represent an accuracy rate of 99.9%.45
In other words, even the best interpreter will make an occa-
sional mistake and still be considered an excellent interpreter.
A number of statutes and rules of court require that the
interpreter provide a “verbatim46
record” of the proceedings while
interpreting witness testimony.47
Because “verbatim records” are
an impossibility, the court inter-
preter mediates between two
extremes of conveying meaning
and a conveying a verbatim
record.48 She does this while
manipulating registers of language
from the most formal legalese used
during motions to the most infor-
mal jargon, such as slang.49 The interpreter performs all these
cognitive functions while interpreting for all courtroom parties
speaking at rates of 200 words or more per minute.50
C.  THE ROLE OF THE COURT INTERPRETER: 
EXPERT WITNESS OR COURT OFFICER?
The court interpreter is a language mediator who, through
interpretation, allows the defendant to be linguistically and
cognitively present in a legal setting.51 Accordingly, the proper
role of the interpreter is to place the non-English speaker, as
closely as is linguistically possible, in the same situation as an
English speaker in a legal setting.52
The interpreter is perhaps the only “officer of the court”
who renders “expert services,” here by rendering regular court
interpretation services. 53 Federal Rule of Evidence 60454 sub-
jects interpreters to expert qualification rules.  An expert wit-
ness interpreter may testify as to translations she or others
have done, or render opinions on questionable interpretations
that other colleagues have made.  A court interpreter must eas-
ily adapt to the dual role occasionally required of her, whether
it is expert witness or interpreter/court officer.  Despite the
dual role, the interpreter is only compensated as an interpreter
and never as an expert witness.55
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48. Id.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 155.
52. Id.
53. Officers of the court are employees or staff who work in the court-
room and are often administered oaths to comport themselves in
a dignified manner in all interactions with judges, counsel, other
court officers, defendants, and witnesses.   FUNDAMENTALS OF
COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 160.
54. Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “An inter-
preter is subject to the provisions of these rules relating to quali-
fication as an expert and the administration of an oath or affir-
mation to make a true translation.”
55. The pay rate of the interpreter does not increase because she is
testifying as an “expert witness.”  In fact, the county may even
refuse to pay the interpreter her daily compensation. The county’s
justification for nonpayment is that an interpreter-witness does
not perform interpreting services while testifying as an expert;
this despite the fact that an interpreter may unwillingly become a
witness as a result of her regular job as a court interpreter. 
40. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 155.
41. See Cardenas, supra note 35.
42. This is a common misconception further exacerbated by the tele-
vision industry’s use on the screen of “voice of the translator”
when interviews/meetings are televised between two heads of
state of different countries.  The screen should read “voice of the
interpreter” because the interpreter is working orally.
43. See Cardenas, supra note 35.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. In the court interpreting field, “verbatim” translation means a
“word-for-word” or “literal” translation.  This is a misnomer
because verbatim translations are rare.  Imagine having to inter-
pret “latch-key child” or “PTA” meetings at school.  These con-
cepts probably do not exist in other countries and must be
explained by the interpreter in a short phrase.  The same problem
arises with legal concepts that have no direct translation such as
“Mirandizing” someone, “six-packs” of photo lineups, or the
“three strikes” laws.  Again, the interpreter must concisely
explain the meaning of the legal concept to the Spanish speaker.  
47. FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 17.
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56. To the author, a lack of cultural-linguistic expertise may arise out
of a lack of multicultural experiences, as is the case with a mono-
lingual person in the United States who has never traveled abroad
or spoken another language by choice.  The author refers to a per-
son fitting this profile as “ethnocentric.” 
57. The statute authorizing the Judicial Council Court Interpreters
Advisory Panel provides:  “The panel shall include a majority of
court interpreters and may include judges and court administra-
tors, members of the bar, and others interested in interpreter ser-
vices in the courts.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68565 (Deering 2001).    
58. For example, in 1997, Wisconsin State Supreme Court Justice
Janine Geske and state bar association members established a
commission on racial and ethnic bias in the courts.  The commis-
sion’s area of study will include sentencing patterns and court
interpretation.  See News, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, June 22,
1997. See also Ellen McCarthy, Annual Report; Keeping California
Courts Fair and Accessible, 1998 CAL. JUD. COUNCIL, ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE CTS. VOL. III, at 18, 24, 41 (discusses strides made by the
Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts Advisory Committee).
59. Telephone interviews with Gregory Drapac, Los Angeles County
Assistant Court Manager, Interpreter Services (Oct. 13, 1998, and
April 17, 2000).
60. Id.
61. The Los Angeles courts subscribe to Language Line Services (for-
merly AT&T Telephone Interpreting Services), whereby interpret-
ing languages that may not be available in Los Angeles can be
accessed by phone.  If no interpreters for an obscure Mexican
tribal language are found in Los Angeles, the courts may pay
AT&T to locate an interpreter for that language who will interpret
by phone from where she is living. Id.
What is unknown to the defendant and his defense attorney is
exactly what standard Language Line Services uses in selecting its
interpreters and whether this standard is enforced.  It is uncertain
whether Language Line Services’ standards are as rigorous as that
of certified court interpreters.  Many certified interpreters work
for Language Line Services in their leisure time, but other people
work for Language Line Services precisely because they are not
certified to work in the courts. 
62. Los Angeles is a city of 3.7 million inhabitants, of which 46.5%
were Hispanic in the 2000 Census.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
HISPANIC POPULATION: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (2001) (available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf).  In unin-
corporated East Los Angeles, the Hispanic population percentage
was 96.8%, the highest concentration of Hispanics in any com-
munity in the United States with 100,000 or more in population.
Hector Becerra & Fred Alvarez, Census Reflects Large Gains for
Latinos, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001 (available at
http://www.latimes.com).   
63. According to Mr. Drapac, the courts do not keep track of the
number of  Spanish cases done by interpreters.  A single inter-
preter may handle 1 to 20 cases a day.  Because the interpreter is
not required to keep count, there is no record of how much work
is actually done.  Drapac interview, supra note 59.
64. The panel is mainly composed of interpreters who have the nec-
essary expertise to advise the judges and administrators while
drafting rules.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68565 (Deering 2001).
65. The author worked in the same building and belonged to the
same pool of interpreters that provided services for the Simpson
criminal trial.  She regularly spoke with her colleague interpreters
who worked directly on it.  The result of these experiences led her
to write the Los Angeles Daily Journal piece published on March
24, 1995. See Cardenas, supra note 35.
D.  FLIPSIDE:
ETHNOCENTRISM OR A
FUNCTION OF SOUND
DECISIONS?
Some would argue that eth-
nocentrism56 is not the reason
why there is a dearth of statutes
and rules to aid the court in
interpreter-related situations—
they are simply unnecessary
because judges are already
making sound decisions per-
taining to interpreter matters.
As delineated in the first part of
this article, it is unlikely that noninterpreters in certain situa-
tions can make sound decisions.  Even a bilingual judge in a
city like Los Angeles is limited in his capacity to draft inter-
preter rules of court, hence the majority representation of
California interpreters on judicial rule-drafting panels.57
Some states are taking their first steps to wipe out ethno-
centrism by recognizing that attitudes of cultural ignorance
exist.58 Once a state recognizes there is a problem in its courts,
it can prioritize its budget accordingly.  California is one such
state that has been forced to examine its history, as described
in the following section. 
II.  EQUAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR 
SPANISH SPEAKERS HAS NOT BEEN 
ACHIEVED IN CALIFORNIA
In Los Angeles County, there are 645 certified court inter-
preters.59 Of this total, 375 are Spanish court interpreters.60 Los
Angeles County provides interpreters for 91 different languages
and has access to168 languages via telephone interpretation.61
The overwhelming number of Spanish court interpreters, as com-
pared to non-Spanish interpreters, is to be expected in a city that
is at 46.5% Hispanic.62 When one factors into the equation that
an interpreter may handle multiple cases in one day, the Spanish
caseload may easily exceed that of any other foreign language.63
The California Rules of Court are more likely to directly
impact the specific conduct and treatment of interpreters than a
general statute.  Statutes on interpreters tend to be very broad,
whereas rules of court are more specific.  If state or federal
statutes are not on point, a court interpreter, such as myself, will
seek guidance from rules of court or the interpreter code of
ethics.  In fact, an interpreter may participate in drafting a rule
of court by being appointed to the Court Interpreters Advisory
Panel that makes rule recommendations to the California
Judicial Council.64 As will be shown below, current court rules
are far from perfect.
A. THE O.J. TRIAL: A CASE IN POINT
The infamous O.J. Simpson trial, of which the author has
some knowledge,65 provides an illustration of how the lack of a
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66. Id.
67. This first interpreter informed the author that she was not
removed due to an imprecise interpretation.  The interpreter
office based the change of interpreter on the defense’s unusual
request for a Salvadoran interpreter.
68. If a proper rule of court standardizing a procedure by which an
attorney can challenge an interpreter had existed, this interpreter
would probably not have been removed merely for being
Mexican-born.  
69. If this were the case, there would be a shortage of Mexican inter-
preters for the large proportion of Mexican Spanish speakers in
the courts.  There would also be an overabundance of Peruvian or
Chilean interpreters for the small number of same-nationality
cases.
70. California Personnel Services (CPS) has administered the Spanish
certification test for many years.  This author studied variations of
CPS tests in order to become certified.  Each year, the tests had
roughly  the same difficulty level, with variations in words, tran-
script subjects, and test proctors.  Today, the Judicial Council indi-
rectly administers the test through the CPS and has entertained
bids from different non-CPS testing entities.  Interview with Judge
Jaime A. Corral, member of the Court Interpreter Advisory Panel
to the California Judicial Council (Sept. 19, 1998).
71. In effect, the interpreter becomes more familiar with different
varieties of Spanish every day.  As a result, many interpreters
compile glossaries of new words, obscure expressions, region-
alisms, and the like.  This enables the interpreter to become more
skilled every day.   
72. See Cardenas, supra note 38.
73. A number of judges will require the attorney and the interpreter
to go to sidebar to “duke it out.”  The interpreter usually wins
based on her certification because the judge will refuse to hear the
attorney’s argument if the attorney is not a certified court inter-
preter.  Another option for the court is to call another interpreter
to get a second opinion.  
74. Memorandum from Alex Abella, Vice-Chair of Greater Los
Angeles Chapter of Court Interpreters Association (GLAC)
Political Action Committee, to General Membership of GLAC
(Sept. 23, 1995) (on file with the author).  GLAC is now known
as the California Federation of Interpreters.  The Abella memo-
randum was a summary of his address to the panel urging action
on interpreter impeachment and substitution.
75. Id.  
76. Challenges to an expert witness’s testimony  are usually done by
the opposing attorney’s expert witness on the same subject—not
by an attorney who is a layperson on the subject matter. 
rule (due to a lack of interest) can lead to the use of unfair tac-
tics by attorneys.  The problem arose out of the defense team’s
insistence on a Salvadoran court interpreter as a replacement
for the first interpreter, who was Mexican-born.  This first inter-
preter had been assisting a  Salvadoran-born defense witness,
Rosa Lopez.66 There was talk in the media of the imprecise
interpretation by the Mexican-born interpreter, although no
direct accusations were made.67 The first interpreter was
removed; her reputation, once impeccable, in question.68
1. Confusion
The removal of the interpreter created mass confusion
among court staff and the general public.  What the public did
not know, nor the defense team, was that interpreters rarely get
assigned to court cases based on their race or country of ori-
gin.69 Not only would it be impractical to do so, but the courts
operate on the assumption that all California certified court
interpreters are competent to interpret a broad use of Spanish
that may be used in as many as 20 different countries that
speak Spanish.  This is because all interpreters basically take
the same variation of a test70 that may include a combination
of Mexican, Salvadoran, Colombian, and/or other Latin
American discourse and slang.71
It would be impossible for interpreters to become familiar
with obscure colloquialisms from every Spanish-speaking
region.  Like an English speaker who cannot know every word
in the English language, or may not know that a British person
calls an elevator a “lift,” the Spanish interpreter cannot know
every word in both languages, nor every usage of a word in all
20 or more Latin American countries where Spanish is spoken,
plus Spain.  
The confusion was so great that court clerks started request-
ing nationality-matching interpreters for their cases.  The
county’s interpreter assignment office, unable to fill such a tall
order, denied most nationality-
matching interpreter requests.
We interpreters reeducated the
court staff on a daily basis by
explaining why these interpreter
requests were impossible to
meet.  As a result of this most
unusual removal of an inter-
preter by the defense team, many
interpreters, including myself,
concluded that this was a ploy to
win more time to prepare Rosa Lopez for testimony.72
2.  Abuse by O.J. Defense Team
As the saying goes, a little knowledge can hurt you.  Along
the same lines, thinking you know a little Spanish may hurt
you, especially if you challenge a court interpreter’s work.
Bilingual or semi-bilingual attorneys will most often engage in
such practices.  How the judge reacts can vary widely between
courts since there are no guidelines to follow in such a con-
frontation.73
Without a court rule, the attorney is free to cast doubt on
almost anything that sounds suspect, especially if his case is
not going well.   The O. J. Simpson defense attorneys did so,
and the California Federation of Interpreters reacted to Judge
Ito’s acquiescence at a Judicial Council Advisory Panel
Committee meeting held on September 23, 1995.74
The California Federation of Interpreters urged the court to
recognize that the “expert witness” status of court interpreters
precludes an attorney, with no interpreter certification, from
challenging the work of a California certified court interpreter.
Only an interpreter-expert witness can state credible grounds
for the impeachment of another interpreter-expert witness.75
A mere layperson cannot.76 The California Federation of
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77. Abella memorandum, supra note 74.
78. All that’s provided for in the rules is a suggested instruction to
counsel in cases in which interpreters are used that “any objection
[be directed] to the court and not the interpreter” and that coun-
sel should “[a]sk permission to approach the bench to discuss the
problem.”  CAL. R. CT., APP., DIV. I § 18.1 (Deering 2001).
79. CAL. R. CT., APP., DIV. I § 18(e) (Deering 2001).  Such a conference
is to be allowed “if the interpreter needs clarification on any
interpreting issues,” including colloquialisms, slang, and techni-
cal terms.  Id.
80. A golden rule in interpretation training is to assimilate as much
information as possible prior to interpreting the subject matter at
hand.  For example, an interpreter will review ballistics terminol-
ogy in English and Spanish prior to interpreting in a trial in which
a ballistics expert is expected to testify.  This ensures accuracy
because an interpreter may not have ready knowledge of ballistics
vocabulary.  The same rule applies to the testimony of any witness
who may use an expression unknown to the interpreter or street
names that may be confusing.  A pre-testimony conference affords
the interpreter the chance to clarify any confusion or research a
word prior to testimony.  It allows the interpreter to interpret with
the highest degree of accuracy.
81. CAL. R. CT., DIV. IV, R. 984.2(b)(2) (Deering 2001).  Applicable to
trials in criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings, the rule
allows a judge to appoint an interpreter who is not certified if the
interpreter is “provisionally qualified” and the judge finds that
“good cause exists to appoint the noncertified interpreter.”  Rule
984.2(b)(3) allows the appointment of a noncertified interpreter
to handle “brief, routine matter[s],” even if not the interpreter is
not “provisionally qualified,” at the request of a defendant or
minor if necessary to “prevent burdensome delay or in other
unusual circumstances.”   CAL. R. CT., DIV. IV, R. 984.2(b)(3)
(Deering 2001).
82. Id. §984.2(b)(3) See (3) to interpret a brief routine matter  (i) if
the defendant has waived the appointment of a certified inter-
preter, (ii) finds that good cause exists . . . etc.
83. The author’s experience is that it is entirely in the judge’s discre-
tion to decide what constitutes a “burdensome delay.”  A judge
may invoke the “good cause” clause if he needs an interpreter, but
no interpreter is available. This tends to occur with non-Spanish
interpreters, who are fewer in number.  If the judge does not wish
to wait a full day or longer for a certified interpreter, he may
invoke the “good cause” clause.   
84. If the good cause clause exists to allow nonqualified people to
interpret, what is the point of seeking training to become quali-
fied?  Certified interpreters must pass tests and comply with con-
tinuing education requirements, much like attorneys.  If they do
not do so, they are dropped from the Judicial Council list of cer-
tified interpreters.  Per Rule §984.2(c)(1), six-month Spanish
interpreters neither take tests nor comply with continuing educa-
tion.  The incentive to become a certified interpreter is under-
mined if a nonprofessional can be deemed an interpreter for a
one-year period (two consecutive six-month periods are allowed)
without having to take a test or comply with continuing educa-
tion requirements. 
85. Rule 984.2(c)(1) provides that in counties with more than 80,000
people, “a noncertified interpreter of Spanish may be allowed to
interpret for no more than any two 6-month periods.”  CAL. R.
CT., DIV. IV, R. 984.2(c(1) (Deering 2001).
Interpreter’s presentation ended
with a call to implement a proce-
dure whereby interpreter substi-
tution does not become a routine
event, needlessly brought about
by an attorney claiming to know
the language better than the
interpreter.77
B.  HOPE FOR AN
INTERPRETATION
CHALLENGE PROCEDURE?
To this day, no rule of court
establishes a procedure for an
attorney to follow should he disagree with the Spanish inter-
pretation.78 The California Federation of Interpreters will no
doubt continue its lobbying efforts before the Judicial Council
committees.
On the brighter side, a procedure was adopted in 1999
under which the interpreter may request a conference with the
witness (and attorney calling the witness) prior to his testi-
mony.79 This is allowed to better acquaint the interpreter with
the witness’s usage of Spanish and any unusual vocabulary he
may use during his testimony.  The pre-testimony conference
has the effect of raising accuracy levels of interpretation
tremendously.80
C.  AN OVERBROAD “GOOD CAUSE” CLAUSE LEAVES
THE QUALITY OF INTERPRETATION IN DOUBT.
Rule 984.2 (b)(2),81 known as the “good cause” clause,
provides the courts with the option to use an uncertified inter-
preter, provided certain conditions showing “good cause” are
met.82 It is the source of much dissension among judges and
interpreters because it lends itself to abuse by the courts,
thereby bypassing the assignment of certified court inter-
preters.  The courts favor it because it is a tool of expediency,
specifically preventing “burdensome delays.”83
For the Spanish speaker, the “good cause” clause signifies a
step back in the struggle for equal access, hearkening back to
the days of self-proclaimed interpreters such as relatives, court
staff, and the like.  This rule violates the purpose of the Court
Interpreters Act and is a blow to the profession of certified
court interpretation.84 It brings the bilingual up to the level of
a certified court interpreter once again.  Even more disturbing,
section (c)(1) of Rule 984.2 permits a nonqualified person to
act as a Spanish interpreter for two consecutive six-month
periods if the judge finds that there is “good cause.”85
The efforts of the Advisory Panel to tighten conditions
attached to the invocation of the “good cause” clause culmi-
nated in 1997 when a representative of the  Mexican-
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) sat
on the Advisory Panel for Court Interpretation.  The represen-
tative communicated to the California Interpreters Association
her efforts to eventually eliminate the “good cause” clause with
regard to the Spanish language.  This feat remains an unat-
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tained objective today because the MALDEF representative’s
term expired before a drafted rule was introduced.  MALDEF
nonetheless paved the way to “good cause” clause reform.
Undoubtedly, community representation on the panel by
groups such as MALDEF is one of the most effective ways
Spanish speakers wield power with respect to the courts. 
In 1999 the Advisory Panel mandated a limit of two con-
secutive six-month periods (within the “good cause” clause)
that a person may be deemed a court interpreter.86 The
MALDEF representative posited while on the panel that there
was no need for the “good cause” clause to be implemented
with respect to Spanish interpreters.  With a list of more than
300 certified Spanish interpreters in Los Angeles County
alone, a court cannot claim that there is “good cause” to deem
anyone else a Spanish interpreter.  The “good cause” clause
should be used as a last resort, not as a mere tool of expediency.
Until the California Rules of Court reflect a true under-
standing of the importance of the court interpreter to
California’s court system, the Spanish speaker will remain on
the fringes of attaining fair and equal treatment as compared
with his English-speaking counterpart.  A better result is pos-
sible only if California’s judges and judicial administrators rec-
ognize that different cultures and languages are represented in
many of our multicultural courtrooms on a daily basis. As a
result, the interpreter is a necessary part of the daily functions
of the court.  The appropriate recognition and use of the certi-
fied court interpreter’s skills is the key to justice for the
Spanish speaker in the California court system.
Roxana Cardenas has been a certified court
interpreter in California state courts since 1989
and in the federal courts since 1996.  She holds
a Master of Arts degree in Spanish
Translation/Interpretation from the Monterey
Institute of International Studies.  Her years of
experience derive from having worked in as
many as 40 different courts in Los Angeles
County.  She is currently employed as a court interpreter and is a
recent graduate of Southwestern University School of Law in Los
Angeles, California.
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Opinion Writing and Footnotes
I applaud the attention given opinion writing in the
Summer 2001 issue of Court Review. Most decisions I make in
a busy Indiana juvenile court as a  magistrate are made imme-
diately and without a detailed opinion. However, in the cus-
tody and visitation realm, there are occasions when a delibera-
tive and detailed analysis is needed. 
In those cases I submit detailed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, not because of a need to define the case for higher
review or because I have been asked to, but because the issues
involved and the decisions made critically affect relationships
between parents and children. Such cases to me merit an
explanation to the litigants of what and why the decision has
been made.
Having had the opportunity to study with F. Reed Dickerson
in the late 1960's at Indiana  University—he was cited by
Joseph Kimble as "the father of legal drafting" in the United
States—and the benefit of participating in a presentation by
Bryan A. Garner to the Indiana judiciary several years ago, I
acknowledge a need to control a personal tendency to be
wordy. Though the objective is not always attained, I do make
an effort to cut back. Helpful in the process is the advantage
given by modern word processing, i.e., an ability to instanta-
neously see and revise while thoughts are fresh.
Though I recall some disdain by Professor Garner for the use
of footnotes in trial court opinions, I continue to use them to
include specific statutes, common-law principles (invariably in
the family law realm I find something useful from Blackstone’s
Commentaries), etc., that may be known to the lawyers
involved but not always to the litigants,  who truly are "con-
cerned about the underlying reasons" why a particular decision
which affects the most basic of relationships has been made.
Thanks for an interesting and useful primer.
Harold E. Brueseke, Magistrate
St. Joseph Probate Court
South Bend, Indiana
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